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Introduction 
 
Since the end of the 1970s, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in economic inequality. 
While the United States has long been among the most unequal of the world’s rich economies, the 
economic and social upheaval that began in the 1970s was a striking departure from the movement 
toward greater equality that began in the Great Depression, continued through World War II, and 
was a central feature of the first 30 years of the postwar period.  
Despite the magnitude of the rise in inequality, the political discourse in the United States refers 
only obliquely to these developments. The public debate generally acknowledges neither the scale 
of the increase in inequality nor, except in the most superficial way, the causes of this sudden and 
sustained turn of events. 
This short essay seeks to provide an alternative view of the postwar period in the United States, 
particularly of the last three decades. My argument is that the high and rising inequality in the 
United States is the direct result of a set of policies designed first and foremost to increase 
inequality. These policies, in turn, have their roots in a significant shift in political power against 
workers and in favor of their employers, a shift that began in the 1970s and continues through 
today.  
The first section of the paper documents the size of the rise in U.S. inequality and puts this change 
into historical context. The second section sketches an explanation for rising inequality, one that 
differs from the deeply rooted, but poorly articulated, vision that lurks just below the surface of 
polite political discourse in the United States. The final section focuses on an important part of 
inequality in the United States that does not receive the attention it deserves. 
 
Rise of Inequality 
 
As economists Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez have documented meticulously, for most of 
the 20th century, economic inequality in the United States was falling or flat.1 (See Figure 1.) The 
last 30 years of increasing economic concentration are the exception, not the rule, of the last 
century of economic development in the United States. 
From a peak just before the 1929 stock market crash through the early 1950s, wage and income 
inequality, broadly measured, were declining. From the early 1950s through the late 1970s, 
economic inequality was flat, or even falling slightly. Since the late 1970s, however, inequality has 
skyrocketed, climbing back to levels last seen in the 1920s. In 1979, for example, the top one 
percent of all U.S. taxpayers received about 8 percent of national income; by 2007, the top one 
percent received over 18 percent. If we include income from capital gains in the calculation, the 
increase in inequality is even sharper, with the top one percent capturing 10 percent of all income in 
1979, but over 23 percent in 2007.  
                                                 
1 See Emmanuel Saez’s homepage http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/ and http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2007.xls 
for further details. For a comprehensive review of U.S. economic inequality, see Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, 
and Heidi Shierholz, The State of Working America 2008-2009, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008. See, 
also, http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/. 
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FIGURE 1: Share of Total Income, Top 1% of U.S. Income Earners 
 
Source: Piketty and Saez (2009) 
 
The Piketty and Saez data are only the simplest (and among the dramatic) ways to demonstrate the 
rise in economic inequality in the United States over the last thirty years. A full discussion of the 
many dimensions of increasing polarization across (and within) education levels, gender, race, and 
region are well documented in The State of Working America, produced every other year by the 
Economic Policy Institute.2 The Piketty and Saez data, however, are sufficient to show an 
enormous increase in economic concentration that is unprecedented in modern U.S. history, 
roughly double in size and duration of the run-up in inequality in the 1920s.  
 
Inequality as Policy: Changing Power Relations 
 
Early on, many conservative analysts in the United States went to great lengths to deny the increase 
in inequality, a particularly difficult task given that a host of economic and social surveys and 
administrative data covering wages, compensation, incomes, and even net worth all showed sharp 
increases in inequality. From the late-1980s, however, the mainstream economics profession had 
turned its attention instead to explaining the rising inequality. The bulk of the profession fairly 
quickly settled on two likely suspects: “skills-biased technical change” and, to a lesser degree, 
“globalization.”  
                                                 
2 Ibid. The wage data summarized in The State of Working America series, for example, show a sharp increase between 
1979 and 2007 in the earnings of high-wage workers (those at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution) and low-
wage workers (those at the 10th percentile). 
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According to the first explanation, the diffusion of computers and related technology in the early 
1980s steadily increased the demand for skilled workers relative to less-skilled workers, driving up 
the wages and incomes of more-educated workers and depressing the wages and incomes of less-
educated workers. From a political perspective, the skills-biased technical change view had several 
convenient features. At face value, it appeared to be broadly consistent with the data (even though 
economists on the left, such as David Howell and Lawrence Mishel, and more mainstream 
economists including David Card, John DiNardo, Alan Manning, and others have presented strong 
critiques3). At least as importantly, however, the technological explanation removed policy, politics, 
and power from the discussion of inequality, by attributing rising economic concentration to 
“technological progress,” a force that could be resisted only at our peril. The skills-biased technical 
change explanation also put significant limits on the terms of policy debates: the problems of the 
three-fourths of the U.S. workforce without a university degree were either the result of the poor 
personal decision not to pursue enough education, or, at most, a sign that, as a society, we needed 
to invest more in education. 
The second standard, though less favored, explanation for rising inequality was the elusive idea of 
“globalization.” In the most common view, globalization is supposed to have lowered the earnings 
of less-educated workers by putting them in direct competition with low-wage workers around the 
world. This competition put pressure on wages through international trade in goods and services; 
through the relocation or threat of relocation of production facilities to overseas locations; through 
competition with immigrants in local labor markets; and through other channels.4 
Globalization is the less favored explanation in the standard political discourse not because it does 
not offer what is at face value a coherent explanation of the rise in inequality, but because, by 
acknowledging the social costs of the increased integration of markets, the globalization explanation 
threatens to derail an important economic project of the elite. Economists and politicians in the 
United States spent much of the 1980s and 1990s arguing that the expansion of trade was the only 
path to national prosperity. In this context, blaming widening inequality on the same process of 
globalization that was supposed to be making us richer became quite awkward. (As an aside, I note 
that globalization has proved itself to be a flexible political tool in the U.S. and European debates. 
On the one hand, it seems, U.S. and European workers are told that their future prosperity depends 
on more globalization. On the other hand, they are also told that globalization means that our 
societies can no longer afford a generous welfare state.) 
But the main problem with globalization as an explanation for rising inequality is that the typical 
ways in which the discussion is framed obscure the underlying process through which globalization 
actually acts on inequality. The standard framing presents globalization, like technological process, 
as an exogenous force, something that happens to us. In reality, globalization is a complex process 
of integrating capital, product, and labor markets, where almost every characteristic of those newly 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz (2009); David Howell, “Theory-Driven Facts and the Growth in 
Earnings Inequality,” Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 31, no. 1 (October 1999), pp. 54-86; David Card and 
John DiNardo, “Skill Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 8779 (February 2002); Maarten Goos and Alan 
Manning, “Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work in Britain,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 
89, no. 1 (February 2007), pp.118–133. 
4 A complete discussion of the impact of globalization on economic inequality is beyond the scope of this essay. For 
an excellent overview, see Josh Bivens, Everybody Wins, Except for Most of Us: What Economics Teaches About 
Globalization, Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 2008. 
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integrated markets is the subject of, or should be the subject of, political and regulatory debate. 
Contrary to the standard framing, which presents globalization as something that no nation can 
resist or even attempt to shape, we can choose the terms under which we integrate capital, product, 
and labor markets across countries. Over the last 30 years we have indeed “chosen” a particular 
form of globalization in the United States – a form that benefits corporations and their owners at 
the expense of workers and their communities. If we had chosen globalization on different terms, 
however, economic integration would not have required rising inequality. Another globalization is 
possible. 
In opposition to these two standard explanations for the recent rise in inequality, I want to offer an 
alternative view, one that explains inequality as a function of power, sustained by politics and 
implemented as policy. In this alternative view, it is not technological progress nor the inevitable 
march of globalization, but rather the sharp shift in the strength of capital and employers relative to 
workers that explains the increasing concentration of wages, income, and wealth over the last three 
decades. 
The decline in inequality from the end of the 1920s through the end of the 1970s – evident in the 
Piketty and Saez graph – was a function of a series of social movements over that same period that 
worked to reduce economic and social inequality. The 1930s saw the ascendancy of the U.S. labor 
movement, which went from a small force scattered across the national geography and industrial 
structure to an institution representing over one-third of U.S. private-sector workers by the mid-
1950s. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s pressed for political, social, and economic 
equality for blacks. The women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s fought for political, social, and 
economic equality for women. The labor movement, the civil rights movement, and the women’s 
movement separately, but especially together, changed the way U.S. corporations did business. 
Wages and benefits rose for all workers, union and non-union. Employers were legally and socially 
prohibited from paying minority and women workers less than white men for the same work. 
Together with the environmental and consumer movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which sought 
to constrain U.S. businesses engaged in endangering the environment and consumers, these social 
movements had the effect of increasing incomes for those at the bottom and  lowering incomes for 
those at the top (by raising the cost of doing business). 
Throughout the entire period, employers resisted each of these movements (labor, civil rights, 
feminist, environmental, and consumer) but employers especially resisted the corresponding 
legislation that accompanied each of these efforts. The economic elite, while eventually comfortable 
with the social aims of all of these movements, almost uniformly opposed the accompanying 
legislation, including: making union organizing easier; guaranteeing workers’ health and safety; 
prohibiting discrimination against racial minorities and women in labor markets and in other 
markets such as housing and credit; protecting the nation’s air and water; and ensuring the safety of 
consumer products. From the 1930s through the 1970s, capital generally fought a losing battle, able 
to shape and contain the specific policies that grew out of the various social movements, but 
ultimately unable to prevent the enactment and enforcement of a host of policies that worked 
strongly against employers’ immediate economic interests. 
By the end of the 1970s, however, the rising costs imposed on employers by these social 
movements coalesced. The economic disruption caused by two oil crises in the 1970s gave capital 
and employers a political opening. Even while Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, was in the White House, 
a subtle but important shift in U.S. politics occurred – a shift away from the core constituency of 
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the Democratic party (labor, women, racial minorities, and environmentalists) – and toward 
employer interests. By the time Carter lost the presidency to Ronald Reagan in 1980, the corporate 
backlash against almost fifty years of social progress was in full swing.5 
The backlash was sold as a response to the economic crisis of the 1970s and the emphasis was 
overwhelmingly on improving the efficiency of the U.S. economy, which was described (and is still 
described today by many on the right) as sclerotic, overly unionized, and overly regulated.6 Each of 
the major policy initiatives of the last three decades claims to offer important efficiency advantages. 
The long decline in the inflation-adjusted value of the minimum wage was supposed to correct a 
distortion in the low-wage labor market. The deregulation (more accurately, re-regulation) of the 
airline, trucking, railway, financial, and telecommunications industries was supposed to lower 
consumer prices in those markets. The liberalization of foreign trade through a plethora of bilateral 
and multilateral trade agreements was similarly supposed to lower consumer prices on imported 
goods. The privatization of many federal, state, and local government functions – from school bus 
drivers to the administration of welfare policy and even much of the U.S. war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan – was supposed to lower the cost of government. The steady, policy-enabled, 
deterioration of unionization in the private sector – from over one-third of workers in the 1950s to 
about eight percent today – was supposed to improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms. 
These policies, sold as ways to enhance national efficiency, however, also have another common 
thread. They all work to lower the bargaining power of workers relative to their employers. In many 
cases, the alleged efficiency gains have not materialized. In every case, the negative impact on 
workers has been obvious and substantial. The inflation-adjusted value of the minimum wage is 
now about 30 percent lower than it was at its peak in the 1960s. Workers in deregulated industries –
airlines and trucking, most obviously – have seen their wages and benefits stagnate and fall. Even 
many mainstream economists acknowledge an important role for corporate-oriented international 
trade and commercial agreements in depressing the wages of less-educated workers, who have been 
forced to compete directly on world markets with workers often making only a small fraction of 
U.S. manufacturing wages. Privatization has been a windfall for the companies who win 
government contracts, while their main efficiency gains hinge on their ability to pay non-unionized, 
private-sector workers less than more unionized public-sector employees. The huge decline in 
unionization in the private sector has decimated the U.S. working class, which depends on the 
union wages and benefit premium to secure a middle-class standard of living.7 
Taken together, these policies – a low and falling minimum wage; the de- or re-regulation of major 
industries; the corporate-directed liberalization of international capital, product, and labor markets; 
                                                 
5    For historical accounts, see Samuel Bowles, David M. Gordon, and Thomas E. Weisskopf, Beyond the Wasteland: A 
Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline, New York: Doubleday, 1984 and Dean Baker, The United States Since 1980, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. For a global perspective on these same issues, see Vicente Navarro, 
“The Worldwide Class Struggle,” Monthly Review, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 18-33. 
6 The restructuring of the U.S. economy, however, generally failed in its drive for efficiency and economic and 
productivity growth did not return to the earlier postwar pace. See, for example, Dean Baker and David Rosnick, 
“‘Usable Productivity’ Growth in the United States: An International Comparison, 1980-2005,” Center for 
Economic and Policy Research Briefing Paper, June 2007. 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/productivity_2007_06.pdf. 
7 For an analysis of factors behind the falling rate of private-sector unionization in the United States, see John 
Schmitt and Ben Zipperer, “Dropping the Ax: Illegal Firings During Union Election Campaigns, 1951-2007,” 
Center for Economic and Policy Research Briefing Paper, March 2009. 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/dropping-the-ax-update-2009-03.pdf. 
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the privatization of many government services; the decline in unionization; and other closely related 
policies – are the proximate cause of the rise in inequality. Of course, the underlying cause is a shift 
at the end of the 1970s in the balance of economic and political power following almost five 
decades of ascendancy of labor and other social movements.  
I am not simply arguing that the explosion of inequality was a side-effect of these policies. I am 
arguing, rather, that the explosion of inequality – what is, effectively, the upward redistribution of 
the large majority of the benefits of economic growth since the late 1970s – was the purpose of 
these policies. The purported efficiency gains, which were realized in some cases but not in others, 
were merely a political distraction. 
 
Beyond Wages and Income 
 
So far, I’ve focused on the rise of inequality and the explanations for it. The measures I’ve referred 
to are based almost exclusively on the distributions of wages, incomes, and wealth. But, these 
distributions, which are – correctly – the centerpiece of any analysis of inequality, also miss an 
important part of the problem facing U.S. workers, their families, and their communities.  
Wages for large swaths of workers, particularly for non-college-educated workers who make up 
about three-fourths of the U.S. workforce, have trailed far behind growth in productivity over the 
last thirty years,8 and, for many groups of workers, wages have actually stagnated or even fallen in 
inflation-adjusted terms.9 While raising wages for workers at the middle and bottom is important, 
raising wages will not be enough. Restoring real wage growth to the two or even three percent per-
year rates experienced during the first thirty years of the postwar period would certainly help. But 
the main problems that U.S. workers face cannot be solved simply with faster real wage growth. 
In my experience, European workers, even European economists familiar with the U.S. economic 
system, have trouble appreciating just how unprotected U.S. workers are; and it is not just workers 
in the low-wage labor market that are unprotected10 – even relatively well-off U.S. professionals 
work in a legal and social environment that almost no worker in western Europe would have to 
tolerate.  
One key issue is job security. In the United States, with rare exceptions, workers are what our legal 
code refers to as “at-will employees” – that is, employees work at the will of the employer, with no 
legal claim to their job or to severance pay in the case of layoff.11 To be clear, in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, U.S. employers can fire a worker without reason or advanced notice and without 
any legal obligation to provide severance pay. The major exceptions to this arrangement are the 13 
percent of the workforce that is unionized and a small share of high-end workers such as company 
                                                 
8 See Dean Baker, “Behind the Gap between Productivity and Wage Growth,” Center for Economic and Policy 
Research Briefing Paper, February 2007. http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/0702_productivity.pdf 
9 For a detailed discussion of wage trends in the United States since the mid-1970s, see Chapter 3 of Mishel, 
Bernstein, and Shierholz (2009). 
10  See, for example, the comparison of low-wage work in the Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, in Jerome Gautie and John Schmitt (eds.), Low-Wage Work in the Wealthy 
World, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, (2009, forthcoming). 
11  The International Labor Organization has published an excellent overview of the relevant U.S. labor law here: 
      http://www.ilo.int/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/termination/countries/usa.htm. 
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officers who negotiate individual contracts with their employers. One remnant of the civil rights 
and women’s movement is that employers cannot fire workers for reasons of race, ethnicity, 
gender, religion, or certain other characteristics; but an employer can fire a worker without notice 
for almost any other reason: for arriving late to work, for refusing to work overtime, for arguing 
with the boss about a schedule change, or essentially any reason, reasonable or not, that does not 
involve discrimination. The “employment at will” doctrine creates a profound structural imbalance 
of power between the overwhelmingly non-unionized workforce and their employers, and is a 
central cause of the problems facing the low-wage workers featured in Roger Weisberg’s superb 
documentary film “Waging a Living.” 
When workers do lose their jobs, the social safety net has many holes. Historically, only about 40 
percent of unemployed workers receive unemployment insurance benefits and these are stingy by 
international standards.12 
The large majority of U.S. workers also depend on their job (or their spouse’s job) for health 
insurance.  With the typical employer-provided health insurance plan costing about $5,000 per year 
for individual coverage and about $13,000 per year for family coverage,13 higher wages alone will 
simply not go far in providing quality health insurance, particularly for lower- and middle-income 
workers. 
U.S. workers also suffer from a severe time squeeze, which is exacerbated by the lack of any legally 
required paid time off. U.S. law, for example, does not mandate any form of paid time off for any 
purpose. As a result, almost one-fourth of U.S. workers have no paid vacation or paid holidays, and 
the average U.S. worker has only nine days of paid vacation and six days of paid public holidays per 
year, with many having less than the average.14 Nor does U.S. law require employers to provide paid 
parental leave.15 In fact, the U.S. law that requires employers to provide 12 weeks of unpaid parental 
leave has exemptions for employer-size and job tenure that effectively remove a large share of the 
U.S. workforce from coverage.16 U.S. workers are not even legally entitled to paid (or unpaid) sick 
days.17 As a result, over 40 percent of U.S. private-sector workers have no paid sick days, and, given 
the “employment at will” doctrine, are at risk of losing their jobs if they stay home from work when 
they are sick. Higher wages alone would do little to give workers the time they seek to handle their 
many non-work responsibilities. 
                                                 
12  Before the current recession, the share of unemployed workers who received unemployment insurance benefits in 
the 2000s varied between 35 and 45 percent (Robert Greenstein and Chad Stone, “Addressing Longstanding Gaps 
in Unemployment Insurance Coverage,” Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, August 2007. 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=517 
13  Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research & Educational Trust, 2009 Employer Health Benefits Survey, p. 14. 
http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/7936.pdf 
14 See Rebecca Ray and John Schmitt, “No-Vacation Nation,” Center for Economic and Policy Research Briefing 
Paper, May 2007. http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/2007-05-no-vacation-nation.pdf. 
15 See Rebecca Ray, Janet Gornick, and John Schmitt, “Parental Leave Policies in 21 Countries Assessing Generosity 
and Gender Equality,” Center for Economic and Policy Research Briefing Paper, June 2009 (revised). 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/parental_2008_09.pdf 
16 See Heather Boushey and John Schmitt, “Job Tenure and Firm Size Provisions Exclude Many Young Parents from 
Family and Medical Leave,” Center for Economic and Policy Research Issue Brief, June 2007. 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/firmsize_2008_02.pdf 
17 See Jody Heymann, Hye Jin Rho, John Schmitt, and Alison Earle, “Contagion Nation: A Comparison of Paid Sick 
Day Policies in 22 Countries,” Center for Economic and Policy Research Briefing Paper, May 2009. 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/paid-sick-days-2009-05.pdf 
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All of these non-wage issues – the lack of legal job protections, the lack of a safety net for most of 
the unemployed, the strong dependence of workers on their employers for health insurance, the 
lack of paid time off, and others – are major challenges for workers at almost all levels of wage 
distribution. But these problems are particularly acute for low-wage workers, who are not just the 
worst paid, but also the least likely to have union-representation, the least likely to have employer-
provided health insurance (or insurance of any kind), and the least likely to have any form of paid 
time off.18  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the standard neoclassical economics framework, low wages are simply a symptom of low levels 
of skill. Wage levels, however, are also a function of unionization rates; the level of the minimum 
wage; the entire regulatory framework governing the terms and conditions of employment, from 
job security legislation to paid time off; the size and scope of the public sector; the degree of 
competition in national and international product markets; and other fundamentally political issues, 
all of which have little or nothing to do with workers’ skills (or technological change or 
globalization).  
The sharp and sustained increase in economic inequality in the United States over the last 30 years 
is not a reflection of a national preference for inequality (discussed more politely as “flexibility”), 
and not the continuation of an inexorable increase in inequality from 1776 to the present. The last 
30 years, in fact, mark a significant departure from a five-decade trend toward greater economic and 
social equality. What changed was not the demand for skilled workers, but the balance of power 
between workers and their employers. 
                                                 
18
 See John Schmitt, Margy Waller, Shawn Fremstad, and Ben Zipperer “Unions and Upward Mobility for Low-wage 
Workers,” WorkingUSA: The Journal of Labor and Society, vol. 11 (2008), no. 3 (September), pp. 337-348. 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121398549/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0 
